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Abstract: This article examines the effects of economic perceptions on party leader 
evaluations and on the overall feelings of voters towards the various parties contesting the 
election. We find that positive feelings towards incumbent parties and premiers and 
negative feelings towards the primary opposition parties and their leaders increase when 
voters feel that the provincial economy is strong. However, such ‘sociotropic’ economic 
perceptions do not affect feelings towards third parties and their leaders. In this sense, 
economic perceptions are important for the battle between the governing party and its 
primary challenger: they prime voters to like either the incumbent party and Premier, or 
like the government-in-waiting and the Premier-in-waiting. On the other hand, voters’ 
evaluations of third parties and their leaders seem to be based on factors other than 
economic perceptions.   
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Résumé: Au lieu d'examiner l'effet des perceptions économiques sur le choix de vote, cet 
article examine les effets des perceptions économiques sur l'évaluation des chefs des partis 
et les effets des perceptions économiques sur les sentiments généraux des électeurs à 
l'égard des différents partis politiques. Nous constatons que des sentiments positifs envers 
les partis et les premiers ministres actuels et des sentiments négatifs envers les partis de 
l'opposition et leurs chefs augmentent lorsque les électeurs estiment que l'économie 
provinciale est forte. Cependant, les perceptions économiques « sociotropiques » 
n’affectent pas les sentiments envers les troisièmes partis et leurs chefs. En ce sens, les 
perceptions économiques sont importantes pour la bataille entre le parti au pouvoir et son 
adversaire principal: ils peuvent renfoncer la tendance des électeurs d’aimer le 
gouvernement et le Premier Ministre ou d’aimer le parti et son chef qui ont la plus la 
chance de faire tomber le gouvernement.  D'autre part, les évaluations des électeurs envers 
les troisièmes partis et leurs chefs semblent être fondées sur des facteurs autres que les 
perceptions économiques. 
 
Mots-clés: l’économie, sociotropic, perceptions économique, les électeurs 
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Theoretical Framework 
 
The importance of economic 
conditions to electoral fortunes is a 
truism in politics; it is often assumed, 
rightly or wrongly, that voters reward 
incumbent governments electorally when 
economic times are good, and punish the 
same governments when times are bad.  
These assumptions have been examined 
in academic research and a robust 
literature examines the relationship 
between the economy and voting; 
researchers have found that the public’s 
perceptions of the state of the economy 
often influence voters’ propensity to 
punish or reward incumbent 
governments by voting for or against the 
incumbent party.  Economic factors are by 
no means considered the only influence 
on how citizens decide which party to 
support, but they have been 
demonstrated to have relevance. What is 
less clear in existing research is the 
impact of economic considerations on 
voters’ evaluations of leaders and their 
political parties (i.e. how much voters 
report liking leaders and political parties 
regardless of if they actually voted for 
them).  
 This article does not examine the 
influence of economic perceptions on 
which party citizens ultimately choose to 
vote for on Election Day (i.e. vote choice). 
For an examination of the effect of 
economic perceptions on vote choice in 
recent Canadian provincial elections, 
readers are instructed to explore the 
article in this special edition by Roy and 
McGrane. Rather, this article examines the 
effect of economic perceptions on voters’ 
feelings towards all of the party leaders 
and political parties contesting an 
election. The central finding of the article 
is that the ‘reward/punish’ logic of 
economic voting theory applies to the 
evaluations of incumbent parties and 
incumbent leaders as well as evaluations 
of primary opposition parties and their 
leaders. It is found that voters who feel 
that the provincial economy is going well 
are more apt to like the incumbent party 
and Premier, whereas voters who feel 
that the provincial economy is going 
poorly are more apt to dislike the primary 
opposition party and its leader. However, 
third party evaluations and third party 
leader evaluations are not influenced by 
economic perceptions.  In this sense, 
economic perceptions matter for the main 
battle of provincial election campaigns: 
they prime voters to support either the 
incumbent party and Premier or the 
government-in-waiting and the Premier-
in-waiting. On the other hand, voters’ 
evaluations of third parties and their 
leaders seem to be evaluated on other 
factors. 
 Before examining the scant 
literature on economic considerations 
and voters’ evaluations of political parties 
and leaders, it is important to explore the 
large and sophisticated literature on vote 
choice and economic considerations (i.e. 
economic voting theory). At the heart of 
economic voting theory is the belief that 
average voters take into account how a 
government handles the economy and 
their perceptions of the current economic 
conditions when voting (Anderson, 2010: 
140). Simply put, it is argued that voters 
hold the incumbent government 
accountable for their current economic 
situation (Happy, 1986: 47). Voters award 
incumbent governments in good 
economic times by voting for the 
incumbent party and punish incumbent 
governments in bad economic times by 
voting for opposition parties. Economic 
voting theory began with Anthony 
Downs’s seminal work, An Economic 
Theory of Democracy (1957). Downs 
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argues that voters make rational 
decisions when voting to determine 
which party will give them the most 
utility, with ‘utility’ defined as the 
economic and political benefits that a 
voter receives from voting for a party 
(1957: 36-37). Voters use their 
perceptions of utility to assess the current 
government; if the personal utility of an 
incumbent government is perceived as 
high, voters will vote for the incumbent 
government, whereas if the personal 
utility of an incumbent government is 
perceived as low, voters will cast a vote 
against the incumbent government 
(Downs, 1957: 38-39).  
Economic voting research extends 
back to the 1960s and includes myriad 
studies from the United States, Europe, 
and Australia (Kramer 1971; Powell and 
Whitten, 1997 Lewis-Beck, 1986; Kinder 
and Kiewiet, 1979; Fiorina, 1978; 
Nannestad and Paldam, 1997). Canadian 
researchers have also used economic 
voting theory as a way to understand 
federal vote choice (Happy, 1986, 1989, 
1992; Archer and Johnson, 1988; 
Carmichael, 1990; Gelineau and Belanger, 
2005; Nadeau and Blais, 1993; Nadeau et 
al., 2000; Anderson, 2010).  Research has 
considered the effect of the influence of 
individuals’ subjective perceptions of the 
economy on voting behaviour. In the 
perceptions studies, researchers 
generally distinguish between two broad 
types of economic perceptions, 
sociotropic and egocentric, and two broad 
timeframes, retrospective and 
prospective. As such, there are four types 
of economic perceptions that can be 
considered: retrospective egocentric, 
retrospective sociotropic, prospective 
egocentric, and prospective sociotropic 
(see Table 1). 
In the economic voting literature, 
the distinction between retrospective and 
prospective perceptions is important as 
voters will take into account how well 
they did economically under a current 
government, as well as how well they 
expect to do economically in the future 
under the same government, or another 
party (Nadeau et al., 2000: 79). While 
some studies examine all four types of 
economic perceptions, most survey 
datasets include only one or two 
measures of economic perception. 
 International studies suggest that 
economic perceptions often – but not 
always – matter when citizens are 
deciding which party to vote for (Clarke 
and Stewart, 1994: 1116; Lanoue, 1994: 
198-199; Nannestad and Paldam, 1995, 
1997; Anderson et al., 2004: 12-15). In 
Canada, Nadeau et al.’s study of the 1997 
federal election found that all four types 
of perceptions influence vote choice, with 
prospective and retrospective sociotropic 
voting perceptions having greater 
influence (Nadeau et al., 2000: 81). 
Anderson’s analysis of federal elections 
from 1988-2006 found that all four types 
of economic perceptions influence 
incumbent vote choice to some degree, 
with sociotropic perceptions having more 
impact than egocentric perceptions, and 
prospective sociotropic perceptions being 
be more salient then retrospective ones 
(Anderson, 2010: 155).  
The influence of subjective 
perceptions of the strength of the 
economy and perceptions of one’s 
personal financial position on vote choice 
has been questioned. Particularly, there is 
doubt cast on the usage of individual 
cross-sectional data and the resulting 
endogeneity (i.e. the independent variable 
is correlated with the error term in a  
regression model).
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Table 1: Categories of Economic Perceptions 
 Thinking about your own 
finances 
Thinking about the entire 
economy 
Thinking about the past Retrospective egocentric: 
Voters’ assessments of how past 
government actions have 
benefited the voter’s personal 
economic situation 
Retrospective sociotropic: 
Voters’ assessments of how 
past government actions 
have benefited the national 
(or provincial) economy 
Thinking about the future Prospective egocentric: Voters’ 
assessments of how future 
government actions will benefit 
the voter’s personal economic 
situation 
Prospective sociotropic: 
Voters’ expectations of how 
future government actions 
will benefit the national (or 
provincial) economy 
 
 
At issue is the causal direction of the 
relationship between vote choice and 
economic perceptions. Some research has 
pointed out that economic perceptions 
are actually structured by political 
preference- i.e. a voter for the governing 
party is naturally inclined to believe that 
the economy is going well because they 
like the government (Kramer, 1983; 
Wlezien et al., 1997; Anderson et al, 2004; 
and Evans and Pickup, 2010). In this 
sense, vote choice is determining 
economic perception and not the other 
way around. The solution is this problem 
is generally to construct models that 
consider the effect of objective economic 
conditions (particularly inflation and 
unemployment) on vote choice. At the 
same time, there have been attempts to 
defend the use of subjective economic 
perceptions as a key determinant of vote 
choice (see Stevenson and Duch, 2013).  
Canadian research has yet to fully 
consider the influence of economic 
perceptions on political factors beyond 
vote choice. Some economic voting 
literature outside of Canada examines the 
relationship between economic variables 
and the popularity of governing parties 
(Mueller, 1970; Goodhart and Bhansali, 
1970; Kramer, 1971). Popularity, in this 
sense, is the party that citizens indicate 
that they would vote for between 
elections- i.e., ‘if an election were held 
today.’ Unlike economic voting research 
that focuses on who the citizen actually 
voted for in an election (vote choice), 
‘popularity function’ studies consider how 
the popularity of the governing party 
changes with changes in economic and 
political conditions (Nannestad and 
Paldam, 1997: 214). A small number of 
Canadian studies have generally found 
qualified support for the conclusion that 
the popularity of the governing parties at 
the federal (Monroe and Erikson, 1986) 
and provincial (Tellier, 2006) levels 
increases in relationship to objective 
economic measurements such as 
unemployment rates, inflation, and GDP. 
However, no literature has examined how 
economic perceptions affect voters’ 
evaluations of particular political parties.  
 Similarly, there appears to be little 
research in Canada on the connection 
between leadership evaluations and 
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economic perceptions. Research does 
show that leadership evaluations are an 
important determinant of vote choice. 
Perrella notes that political parties are 
often “defined by their leaders” (2010: 
240). After examining Canadian Election 
Studies over a 30 year time span, Gidengil 
et al. found evidence that leadership 
evaluations are a strong determinants of 
vote choice (2000a: 14). In particular, 
leadership evaluations had a large effect 
on vote choice in the 2000 (Blais et al., 
2002: 175) and 2004 elections (Gidengil 
et al, 2006: 18). In her analysis of 
Canadian Election Study data from 1988 
to 2006, Bittner found that perceptions of 
leadership traits were a factor in vote 
choice as well, but not to the same extent 
as partisanship, and a leader’s perceived 
character was more important than 
perceptions of competency (2010: 200). 
She also found that socio-demographics, 
partisanship, ideological self-placement, 
and issues attitudes (such as taxes versus 
spending) can impact leadership 
evaluations (Bittner, 2011: 53-72). 
However, she did not include economic 
perceptions in her analysis.  
  The one research study that has 
examined the relationship between 
objective economic measurements and 
leadership evaluation at the federal 
Canadian level is Nadeau and Blais 
(1995).  They examine the relationship 
between voting for the Liberal Party in 
Canadian federal elections, Canada’s 
unemployment rate, and proportion of 
Canadians who think that the Liberal 
leader would make the best Prime 
Minister according to Gallup Polls.  
Interestingly, they found that the 
objective measure of the unemployment 
rate was of little use in explaining 
variation in Canadian’s evaluation of the 
Liberal leader. On the other hand, both 
the rate of unemployment and leadership 
evaluations did impact the success of 
Liberal leaders in getting elected as Prime 
Minister.  Nadeau and Blais conclude that, 
while the unemployment rate and 
leadership evaluations affect federal vote 
choice, these two variables have a weak 
relationship to each other and 
predominantly act independently to 
influence vote choice. No research has 
examined the relationship between 
subjective economic perceptions and 
leadership evaluations in Canada.  Indeed, 
this is the gap in the literature that we 
attempting to fill.  
While there appear to be some 
interesting linkages between vote choice, 
leadership evaluations, and economic 
perceptions, there is little work that 
isolates the relationship between how a 
person perceives the strength/weakness 
of the economy and how they evaluate 
leaders and their parties in Canada.  
Recently, using data considering the 2011 
Saskatchewan election, Clavelle (2013) 
found that economic perceptions were an 
important predictor of the incumbent 
premier’s leadership evaluations.  
Further, Clavelle found that economic 
perceptions were not a predictor of the 
opposition party leader’s leadership 
evaluations.  Overall, he concluded that 
economic perceptions had an indirect 
effect in the 2011 Saskatchewan election 
by structuring leadership evaluations, 
which in turn were a significant predictor 
of vote choice.  We use CPEP data to 
explore this relationship between 
economic perceptions and leadership 
evaluations beyond the Saskatchewan 
context.  
In sum, Canadian researchers have 
been curious about the effect of economic 
perceptions on public attitudes beyond 
vote choice. However, there has been 
little attempt to pursue this research 
avenue in a systematic fashion and to 
Canadian Political Science Review Vol. 9, No. 1, 2015, 92-111 
97 
 
disentangle economic perceptions from 
other behavioural variables. Further, 
nearly all of the research on economic 
voting in Canada has looked only at the 
federal level, despite the fact that 
provincial government policy greatly 
influences the performance of Canada’s 
economy.  Provincial governments set the 
rates of a wide range of taxes, play a key 
role in environmental assessments, 
administer skills training programs, and 
own various Crown Corporations and 
public utilities. Economic issues play an 
important role in provincial elections and 
the policies of the parties that are elected 
to form provincial governments have a 
decisive economic impact. As such, we 
examine the Canadian provinces as 
laboratories to explore how economic 
perceptions shape broader attitudes 
towards politics such as voters’ 
evaluations of provincial parties and their 
leaders.  
 
Methodology 
 
The Comparative Provincial 
Election Project (CPEP) survey data 
presents a unique opportunity to consider 
more closely the influence of economic 
perceptions on leader and party 
evaluations. Despite a larger economic 
downturn, there was considerable 
variation in provincial economic fortunes 
at the time of the 2011 and 2012 
elections.  In some cases (e.g., 
Saskatchewan), the provincial economy 
was robust; in other cases (e.g., Ontario), 
the provincial economy was experiencing 
distress. Further, discussions of the 
economy were more central to some 
election campaigns than to others (see 
Sampert, this special edition).   
 Drawing on the CPEP survey data for 
eight provinces, this paper considers 
three research questions: 
1. What is the relationship between 
economic perceptions and voters’ 
evaluations of incumbent leaders 
and parties? 
2. What is the relationship between 
economic perceptions and voters’ 
evaluations of the primary 
opposition leader and party? 
3. What is the relationship between 
economic perceptions and voters’ 
evaluations of third party leaders 
and third parties?  
Using a model that tests the effects of 
a large number of variables, the Roy and 
McGrane article in this edition examines 
the relationship between vote choice and 
economic perceptions during provincial 
elections. Rather than replicating Roy and 
McGrane’s analysis, our analysis 
considers six separate dependent 
variables concerning the evaluation of 
leaders and political parties using data 
from eight provincial elections 
(Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince 
Edward Island, Quebec, Ontario, 
Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and 
British Columbia). In the construction of 
these variables, ‘incumbent party’ is 
defined as the party that held government 
going into the provincial election that we 
are examining. ‘Primary opposition party’ 
is defined as the non-incumbent party 
that the received highest popular vote in 
the provincial election under study (not 
the previous provincial election). In an 
effort to preserve cases and exclude 
fringe parties, we define ‘third parties’ 
strictly as the parties who placed third in 
popular vote in the various elections 
under exploration. In Saskatchewan and 
PEI, the third place parties were more like 
fringe parties as opposed to true third 
parties so they were excluded from our 
analysis.1   
   The six dependent variables are as 
follows:  
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 incumbent Premiers’ leadership 
evaluations;  
 evaluation of incumbent governing 
parties;  
 primary opposition party leaders’ 
evaluations (specifically, the 
aggregated leadership evaluations 
of Adrian Dix in British Columbia, 
Danielle Smith in Alberta, Dwain 
Lingenfelter in Saskatchewan, 
Hugh McFadyen  in Manitoba, Tim 
Hudak in Ontario, Pauline Marois 
in Quebec, Olive Crane in Prince 
Edward Island, and Lorraine 
Michael in Newfoundland and 
Labrador); 
 evaluation of the primary 
opposition parties (specifically, the 
aggregated evaluations of the 
following parties: British Columbia 
NDP, Alberta Wildrose Party, 
Saskatchewan NDP, Manitoba 
Progressive Conservatives, Ontario 
Progressive Conservatives, Parti 
Québécois, PEI Progressive 
Conservatives, and Newfoundland 
and Labrador NDP);  
 third party leaders’ evaluations 
(specifically, the aggregated 
leadership evaluations of Green 
Jane Sterk in BC, Liberal Raj 
Sherman in Alberta, Liberal Jon 
Gerrard in Manitoba, NDP Andrea 
Horwath in Ontario, CAQ Francois 
Legault in Quebec, and Liberal 
Kevin Alyward in Newfoundland 
and Labrador); and 
 evaluations of third parties 
(specifically, the aggregated 
evaluations of the following 
parties: British Columbia Green 
Party, Alberta Liberal Party, 
Manitoba Liberal Party, Ontario 
NDP, Coalition Avenir Quebec, and 
the Newfoundland and Labrador 
Liberals).  
All leadership and party evaluations 
are measured on a 100 point scale. 
Respondents were asked:  
 
Using a 100-point scale, where zero means 
that you really dislike the leader (party) 
and 100 means that you really like the 
leader (party), how do you feel about the 
following party leaders (political parties)?  
 
The independent variables of interest 
are retrospective sociotropic and 
retrospective egocentric economic 
evaluations.  Since CPEP examines 
provincial elections, we relied on a 
question regarding provincial economies 
as opposed to the Canadian economy as a 
whole. Retrospective sociotropic 
economic evaluations are measured 
through the question: “Over the past year, 
has [your province’s] economy improved, 
worsened or stayed about the same?” 
This question was coded 3=improved, 
2=stayed about the same, and 
1=worsened. Retrospective egocentric 
economic evaluations are measured 
through the question “Financially, are you 
better off, worse off, or about the same as 
a year ago?” This question was coded 
3=better off, 2=about the same as a year 
ago, and 1=worse off. Retrospective 
economic perceptions were chosen 
because most economic voting theories 
see elections as an opportunity for voters 
to pass judgment on the incumbent 
party’s past performance when it comes 
to the economy. Similarly, perceptions of 
the strength of the provincial economy 
were used because provincial leaders and 
parties are most likely to focus on 
provincial economic issues as opposed to 
national and local economies. As might be 
expected, there is a moderate, though not 
strong, correlation between sociotropic 
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and egocentric evaluations (Pearson’s 
R=.320). Evidently, respondents feel that 
the strength or weakness of the provincial 
economy is not necessarily reflected in 
their own personal financial situation. 
Considering the varying economic 
contexts within Canadian provinces 
during the time of these elections, 
objective indicators such as levels of 
unemployment and inflation could have 
been used as independent variables. 
However, the difficulties of integrating 
such objective measures into individual 
level survey data and space limitations 
meant that pursuing such an analysis was 
not feasible.  
Sociodemographic control variables 
include province (dummy variables for 
Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Quebec, 
Newfoundland and Labrador, and Prince 
Edward Island, with Ontario as the 
reference category); sex (female=1, 
male=0), age in years, education (0=less 
than high school diploma, 4 = professional 
degree/doctorate), income (0 = less than 
$20,000, 10 = over $100,000); religious 
affiliation (Catholic, Protestant, other 
religion, with no affiliation/atheist as the 
reference category); visible minority 
(1=visible minority, 0 = not visible 
minority); union membership (1=union 
member, 0 = non-union member); and 
rural (1=rural resident; 0 = 
urban/suburban resident).   
 
Findings 
 
The Roy and McGrane article 
employs a multivariate type of analysis 
called the ‘bloc recursive’ model that tests 
the impact of a large number of variables 
on vote choice. Besides sociotropic and 
egocentric economic perceptions, the 
other variables in their model includes 
social background, beliefs and values, 
party identification, issues opinions, and 
leader evaluation. Their analysis reveals 
that in four of the eight provincial 
elections that we are examining 
(Newfoundland, Ontario, Manitoba, and 
Saskatchewan), positive sociotropic 
economic perceptions were a significant 
factor in explaining voting for the 
incumbent party. As for egocentric 
economic perceptions, this variable was 
only significant in explaining voting for 
the incumbent Saskatchewan Party. As we 
will see, our analysis below is generally 
congruent with the findings of Roy and 
McGrane.   
Before looking at the evaluations 
of parties and leaders, we briefly look at 
the bivariate relationship between 
economic perceptions and vote choice in 
each provincial election. While vote 
choice is not our main concern, it is 
important to understand the impact of 
economic perceptions on voting for the 
three types of parties that we are 
examining (incumbent party, primary 
opposition party, and third party).  Tables 
2 and 3 illustrate the mean of 
respondents’ sociotropic and egocentric 
retrospective economic perceptions, 
broken down by the type of party for 
which they voted.   
Several clear patterns emerge 
from the data in Tables 2 and 3.  First, in 
virtually every case, the sociotropic and 
egocentric economic perceptions of 
incumbent party voters were more 
positive than those of primary opposition 
party voters.  This finding is very much in 
line with the view that voters ‘reward’ 
incumbent parties when they perceive 
that the economy is strong and their 
personal financial situation is improving. 
In some cases, the difference in the means 
between the voters of the various parties 
may not have been large enough to make 
this variable significant for certain 
elections.  Nonetheless, our data establish   
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Table 2: Vote Choice and Mean of Retrospective Sociotropic Economic Perceptions by Province 
(1=worsened, 2=stayed about the same, and 3=improved) 
 
 Voted Incumbent 
 
Voted Primary Opposition Party Voted Third Party 
NL 2.59 2.35 2.21 
PE 1.93 1.51 N/A 
QC 2.06 1.77 1.78 
ON 2.12 1.39 1.62 
MB 2.27 1.76 2.06 
SK 2.78 2.24 N/A 
AB 2.46 2.19 2.31 
BC 2.22 1.52 1.85 
 
Table 3: Vote Choice and Mean of Retrospective Egocentric Economic Perceptions by Province 
(1=worsened, 2=stayed about the same, and 3=improved) 
 
 Voted Incumbent 
 
Voted Primary Opposition Party Voted Third Party 
NL 2.00 1.92 1.86 
PE 1.85 1.75 N/A 
QC 2.01 1.86 1.97 
ON 1.93 1.77 1.72 
MB 1.94 1.97 1.71 
SK 2.14 1.75 N/A 
AB 2.12 2.03 2.06 
BC 2.05 1.71 1.97 
an important bivariate relationship 
between vote choice and economic 
perceptions that supports the basic 
theory of economic voting and the 
analysis of Roy and McGrane. 
Second, in all cases, the difference 
in economic perceptions between 
incumbent party voters and primary 
opposition party voters is much greater 
for sociotropic economic perceptions 
than egocentric economic perceptions. 
Congruent with the analysis by Roy and 
McGrane, such a finding suggests that 
sociotropic economic perceptions have a 
greater impact on vote choice in the 
provincial elections that we are 
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examining than do egocentric economic 
perceptions. Voters may be keener to 
evaluate the incumbent party on how its 
policies have improved the entire 
provincial economy instead of focusing on 
the more abstract effect that government 
policy may have had on their own 
personal finances.  
Third, Roy and McGrane’s analysis 
only examined voting for incumbent 
parties and it did not examine how 
economic perceptions could have a 
different impact on third parties and the 
primary opposition party. For the most 
part, our data show that third party 
voters had more positive economic 
perceptions than did primary opposition 
party voters (even though third party 
voters’ economic perceptions always 
remained less positive than those who 
voted for the incumbent party). This 
finding suggests that economic 
perceptions may have a greater impact on 
voting for primary opposition parties 
than voting for third parties. If a voter is 
really negative about the economy and 
their financial situation, they may choose 
to opt for the primary opposition party 
because that action would have the best 
chance of resulting in immediately 
changing the government and bringing 
different policies that could improve 
economic growth.  
Bivariate analysis confirms that, 
prior to introducing other types of 
variables, economic perceptions do have 
an important impact on choosing between 
the two major parties contesting a 
provincial election.  Further, economic 
factors have less influence on voters for 
third parties that do not have a realistic 
chance at forming government than on 
voters of the incumbent party and its 
main challenger. To further our 
understanding of the effect of economic 
perceptions on provincial election 
campaigns, we now move away from 
looking at economic perceptions and vote 
choice to our primary investigation, 
which is the examination of the influence 
of economic perceptions on what may be 
termed ‘antecedent’ factors to vote choice 
such as liking and disliking political 
parties and leaders. Our findings below 
will illustrate that retrospective 
sociotropic economic perceptions can 
prime citizens to vote in certain ways on 
election day.  To do this, we aggregate the 
voters in all provinces together to 
examine the six dependent variables 
specified earlier. The advantages of 
aggregating all provinces together are the 
creation of very large dataset to work 
with and the ease of interpreting one 
table instead of several tables. We control 
for ‘province’ in our multivariate analysis, 
which allows us to discern any impact 
that a respondent’s province of residence 
may exert.   
Looking first at the bivariate 
analysis of the correlations between 
sociotropic and egocentric economic 
perceptions and our six aggregated 
dependent variables concerning 
evaluations of parties and leaders (Table 
4), positive sociotropic evaluations are 
strongly correlated to positive feelings 
towards incumbent premiers and 
incumbent parties. Positive egocentric 
evaluations are also correlated with 
feelings towards premiers and incumbent 
parties, but the relationship is much 
weaker. A similar pattern is portrayed 
when it comes to primary opposition 
parties and leaders. Positive sociotropic 
economic perceptions are strongly 
correlated with negative feelings towards 
primary opposition parties and leaders 
while positive egocentric economic 
perceptions have a significant, but 
weaker, correlation with negative feelings 
towards primary opposition parties and 
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their leaders. This evidence suggests that 
voters are primed to vote for the 
incumbent party when they have positive 
sociotropic, and to a lesser extent 
egocentric, economic perceptions. 
However, economic perceptions are much 
less of a driver of feelings towards third 
parties and their leaders. The correlations 
between economic perceptions and 
feelings towards third parties and their 
leaders are not significant. In this sense, 
economic perceptions do not appear to 
prime citizens to vote for third parties. 
A further question of interest is the 
extent to which voters blame incumbent 
provincial governments for bad economic 
times and give credit to incumbent 
provincial governments for good 
economic times. In order to examine this 
question, the CPEP survey asked voters 
who indicated that they believed that the 
provincial economy had improved the 
following question: “Have the policies of 
the PROVINCIAL government made [the 
name of province]’s economy better, or 
have they not made much difference?”  
Similarly, voters who responded 
that the economy had worsened were 
asked, “Have the policies of the 
PROVINCIAL government made [the 
name of province]’s economy worse, or 
have they not made much difference?” 
Voters who felt that the economy had 
‘stayed the same’ were not asked this 
question. The result is a subset of CPEP 
respondents whose attitudes can be 
probed to understand the effect of 
assigning blame/giving credit for state of 
the provincial economy on party and 
leader evaluations. First, it should be 
noted that 64% of voters who thought 
that provincial economy had improved 
gave credit to the policies of the 
provincial government while 66% of 
voters who thought that the economy had 
worsen blamed the provincial 
government’s policies. This finding is 
consistent with the logic of economic 
voting theory that voters punish 
incumbent government for bad economic 
times and reward incumbent 
governments for good economic times. 
Whether merited or otherwise, voters do 
appear to generally hold provincial 
governments accountable for the state of 
the provincial economy.  
Second, how does assigning blame 
and giving credit affect the evaluations of 
leaders and their parties? Table 5 reports 
the means for our six dependent variables 
concerning party and leader evaluations 
for this subset of CPEP respondents. 
A familiar pattern emerges in 
Table 5: the ratings of the Premiers and 
incumbent parties as well as those of the 
primary opposition parties and their 
leaders are greatly affected by the 
assignment of credit/blame while third 
parties and their leaders were affected 
quite little. Voters who thought that the 
economy was improving and that the 
provincial government was responsible 
for the improvement were more likely to 
rate the incumbent party and Premier 
quite high and the primary opposition 
party and its leader quite low. The 
reverse was true for those voters that 
thought that the economy was worse and 
blamed the provincial government’s 
policies. However, the extent to which a 
voter blamed the government for bad 
economic times or praised it for good 
economic times seemed to matter little to 
how they evaluated third parties or third 
party leaders. 
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Table 4:  Correlations between Economic Perceptions, Evaluations of Leaders, and Evaluation of Parties 
(Pairwise Deletion) 
 
Dependent Variable Sociotropic Evaluations Egocentric Evaluations 
Incumbent Premiers 0.4515a (n=6567) 0.1807a (n=6579) 
Incumbent Parties 0.4099a (n=6516) 0.1763a (n=6528) 
Primary Opposition Party Leaders -0.1129a (n=6534) -0.0262c (n=6545) 
Primary Opposition Parties -0.1408a (n=6510) -0.0277c (n=6522) 
Third Party Leaders 0.0011 (n=5198) -0.0193 (n=5206) 
Third Parties 0.0089 (n=5240) 0.0073 (n=5249) 
a: p≤.001, b: p≤.01, c: p≤.05 
 
 
Table 5:  Credit/Blame for Economic Performance and Mean of Party and Leader Evaluation (0= really dislike 
and 100=really like) 
 Thinks that economy 
has got improved and 
that the policies of the 
provincial government 
have made economy 
better 
Thinks that economy 
has improved and 
that  
policies of the 
provincial 
government have 
not made much of a 
difference 
Thinks that economy 
has worsened and 
that the policies of 
the provincial 
government have 
made economy 
worse 
Thinks that economy 
has worsened and 
that  
policies of the 
provincial 
government have 
not made much of a 
difference 
Incumbent Premiers 72.8 (n=1266) 46.0  (n=720) 15.6  (n=952) 42.0 (n=607) 
Incumbent Parties 69.0 (n=1250) 42.7 (n=710) 18.0 (n=945) 40.7 (n=608) 
Primary Opposition 
Party Leaders 
28.3 (n=1257) 49.2 (n=716) 48.7 (n=944) 38.4 (n=604) 
Primary Opposition 
Parties 
28.8 (n=1248) 49.1 (n=712) 54.7 (n=945) 37.3 (n=607) 
Third Party Leaders 43.7 (n=815) 44.7 (n=588) 42.6 (n=803) 48.6 (n=498) 
Third Parties 40.4 (n=813) 35.9 (n=593) 37.5 (n=810) 43.1 (n=504) 
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 The multivariate analysis for our 
six dependent variables concerning the 
evaluations of parties and leaders 
presents a fuller picture and tests 
whether the bivariate relationships hold 
when we control for other pertinent 
variables (Table 6). These multivariate 
analyses were completed using OLS 
regression.  This technique is 
appropriate for the leadership and 
political party evaluations, as all are 
interval-level variables ranging from 0 
to 100.  
When it comes to evaluations of 
parties and leaders, it is important to 
note provincial variations. Using Ontario 
as a reference category produces an 
important effect on the regression when 
exploring the effect of province of 
residence on leader and party 
evaluations. Table 6 depicts that 
respondents from provinces where the 
governing party was comfortably 
returned to power (Saskatchewan, PEI, 
Newfoundland and Labrador, and 
Manitoba) had a greater propensity to 
have positive feelings towards the 
incumbent Premier and party than 
respondents from Ontario, where the 
governing Liberals won a minority 
government. However, residents of 
most other provinces also had more 
positive feelings towards their primary 
opposition parties than did Ontarians. 
These findings illustrate that, as a group, 
the Ontario Liberals, Dalton McGunity, 
the Ontario Progressive Conservatives, 
and Tim Hudak were significantly less 
liked than their respective colleagues in 
several other Canadian provinces.  
When it comes to third parties, the 
opposite is true: the Ontario NDP and 
Andrea Horwath were generally better 
liked than third parties in most of the 
other provinces examined.  
A number of other socio-
demographic factors emerged as 
significant in Table 6. Specifically, 
women and the higher educated liked 
incumbent Premiers and parties as well 
as third parties and their leaders more 
than men and the lower educated did; 
older respondents were more likely to 
like the incumbent Premier and party 
more than were younger respondents; 
union members liked third parties and 
their leaders more than non-union 
members did; and Catholic and 
Protestants liked opposition parties and 
their leaders more than atheists did. 
Overall, a voter’s socio-demographic 
position can lead to a predisposition for 
liking certain parties and leaders.  This 
finding is congruent with the relatively 
important role that socio-demographic 
factors play in explaining vote choice in 
Roy and McGrane’s application of the 
bloc recursive model to these eight 
provincial elections. 
 Looking specifically at 
sociotropic and egocentric economic 
perceptions, our independent variables 
of interest, the multivariate analysis 
supports the findings of the bivariate 
analysis.  Even after controlling for 
other variables, positive sociotropic 
evaluations of the provincial economy 
produce positive feeling towards the 
incumbent party and premier and 
negative feelings towards the primary 
opposition party and its leader. 
Following the ‘reward/punish’ logic of 
economic voting theory, it appears that 
voters reward incumbent parties and 
Premiers for a strong economy and feel 
less positively about the government-in-
waiting and Premier-in-waiting when 
they perceive the provincial economy to 
be strong. In this sense, positive 
sociotropic economic perceptions prime 
citizens to vote for the incumbent party 
and negative sociotropic economic 
perceptions prime citizens to vote for 
the primary opposition party. Again 
confirming the bivariate analysis, 
feelings towards third parties and their 
leaders are not impacted by sociotropic 
economic perceptions. This finding 
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suggests that third parties and their 
leaders were evaluated on grounds 
other than perceptions of the 
strength/weakness of the provincial 
economy.   
  
Implications 
 
Our exploration of CPEP data in 
regards to economic perceptions and 
feelings towards political parties and 
their leaders raises three important 
issues for our understanding of 
Canadian provincial politics. First, 
assessing the impact of the economy on 
Canadian provincial elections is a 
difficult task. It is our contention that 
the impact of economic perceptions can 
sometimes be diluted in large 
multivariate analyses of vote choice 
when powerful explanatory variables 
such as leadership evaluations and 
partisanship are included. Using data 
from eight provincial elections, we find 
evidence that positive sociotropic 
economic perceptions lead to more 
positive feelings towards incumbent 
parties and Premiers and more negative 
feelings towards primary opposition 
parties and leaders. As such, sociotropic 
economic perceptions can prime 
citizens to vote for certain parties. In 
this way, economic perceptions act as 
important antecedent variables that can 
influence a voter’s leadership and party 
evaluations that, consequently, have 
large impacts on vote choice.   As such, 
our findings suggest the existing 
literature on vote choice at both the 
provincial and federal level in Canada 
may be missing some earlier steps in the 
causality when it comes to assessing 
how economic perceptions affect vote 
choice.   
Second, the analyses in this 
article and the article by Roy and 
McGrane in this special edition make it 
quite clear that egocentric economic 
perceptions did not have a large impact 
on vote choice or the evaluations of 
leaders and parties in the eight elections 
examined. In terms of economic 
perceptions, these elections were 
referendums on the extent voters felt 
that provincial economy had improved.  
However, while voters view provincial 
governments as being accountable for 
the overall performance of the economy, 
they seem less inclined to see provincial 
governments as being responsible for 
their own personal finances.  As argued 
above, the link between government 
policy and one’s own personal financial 
situation is quite abstract and difficult to 
map out. On the other hand, voters do 
expect government be competent 
managers of the provincial economy and 
judge political parties and their leaders 
in this light. 
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Table 6: Multivariate Analysis of Evaluations of Leaders and Parties 
 Premiers’ 
Evaluations 
Governing Party 
Evaluations 
Primary Opposition 
Parties Leaders’ 
Evaluations 
Primary Opposition 
Parties’ Evaluations 
Third Party 
Leadership 
Evaluations 
Third Parties’ 
Evaluations 
 B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) 
QC* -4.15 
(2.308909) 
-3.31 
(2.377126) 
12.67a 
(2.734026) 
8.66b 
(3.054175) 
-8.49a 
(2.530085) 
-7.36b 
(2.394039) 
SK* 15.35a 
(2.300102)* 
10.39a 
(2.365417) 
-8.73a 
(2.171912) 
4.11 
(2.681525) 
N/A N/A 
PE* 15.39a 
(2.594122) 
11.70a 
(2.617578) 
4.32 
(2.35102) 
4.40 
(2.7355738) 
N/A N/A 
MB* 8.30a 
(2.158397) 
6.01b 
(2.276253) 
6.13b 
(2.051647) 
1.20b 
(2.358381) 
-15.05a 
(1.951337) 
-11.03a 
(1.874615) 
NL* 10.02a 
(2.32194) 
5.65c 
(2.360238) 
21.80a 
(2.226198) 
16.81a 
(2.518472) 
-3.51 
(2.37318) 
12.45a 
(2.015269) 
AB* -.005 
(2.1319) 
-3.76 
(2.111954) 
14.59a 
(2.237838) 
10.24a 
(2.516044) 
-12.53a 
(1.964611) 
-5.99b 
(1.800106) 
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BC* -.511 
(2.09796) 
-3.85 
(1.934712) 
9.89a 
(1.952879) 
8.80a 
(2.243019) 
2.95 
(2.098016) 
.42 
(1.90959) 
Female 5.95a 
(1.456575) 
4.22.b 
(1.439797) 
1.15 
(1.58667) 
-2.03 
(1.764347) 
7.78a 
(1.603852) 
6.88a 
(1.450518) 
Age .23a 
(.0490545) 
.10c 
(.502049) 
-.02 
(.0536103) 
-.06 
(.624763) 
-.11c 
(.0532879) 
.10c 
(0.501432) 
Education 1.85a 
(.3511262) 
1.50a 
(.346224) 
-.85c 
(.3828558) 
-1.07c 
(.4263535) 
1.51a 
(.38-7946) 
1.41a 
(.3338859) 
Income .32 
(.2458176) 
.34 
(.239284) 
.21 
(.2668376) 
.02 
(.3009621) 
-.77b 
(.2658731) 
-.47 
(.2437058) 
Catholic** 3.40 
(1.995342) 
2.03 
(2.061107) 
7.98a 
(2.273191) 
8.06b 
(2.550237) 
-4.85c 
(2.256182) 
-.83 
(2.086203) 
Protestant** 2.95 
(1.939128) 
5.20b 
(1.845554) 
7.79a 
(2.062408) 
10.55a 
(2.294675) 
-4.75c 
(2.025517) 
-2.49 
(1.900781) 
Other religion 
** 
.85 
(2.264344) 
3.12 
(2.198408) 
4.39 
(2.570572) 
5.14 
(2.291774) 
-.69 
(2.442069) 
1.41 
(2.429958) 
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Visible 
minority 
7.74c 
(3.643632) 
11.24a 
(3.049319) 
-2.45 
(3.508063) 
1.628797 
(2.062408) 
1.52 
(3.348506) 
3.35 
(3.047953) 
Foreign born 1.95 
(2.707423) 
-.15 
(2.440548) 
.69 
(3.259859) 
1.73 
(2.71808) 
-3.48 
(2.788974) 
-4.73 
2.719898 
Union  -.07 
(1.864695) 
-1.00 
(1.87924) 
-.35 
(2.004782) 
-1.55 
(2.160822) 
6.68a 
(2.069603) 
4.61c  
(1.883929) 
Rural -1.61 
(1.790059) 
-3.40 
(1.749674) 
5.12b 
(1.894685) 
2.25 
(2.16657) 
-1.08 
(1.970616) 
-1.65  
(1.798954) 
All significant coefficients are bolded (a= p≤.001, b= p≤.01, c= p≤.05). Reference categories are as follows: * = Ontario and **= No religion.  
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 Third, our central finding is that 
‘reward/punish’ logic of economic voting 
theory pertains to the evaluation of the 
incumbent party and the Premier as well as 
the primary opposition party and its leader. 
Our multivariate analysis finds evidence that 
positive economic perceptions concerning 
the performance of the provincial economy 
are correlated with voters liking both the 
incumbent party and the incumbent 
Premier, which primes these voters to 
ultimately vote to maintain the incumbent 
government.  Similarly, negative economic 
perceptions are correlated with voters liking 
the primary opposition party and the leader 
of the primary opposition party, which 
primes these voters to vote against the 
government and in favour of the most 
feasible alternative.  
However, economic perceptions 
appeared to not prime respondents to vote 
for or against third parties. Perhaps, voting 
for a third party is not seen as having a little 
immediate effect on the economy because 
the party has a very small chance of forming 
government.  Our analysis illustrated that 
respondents who voted for third parties 
were neither as negative about the economy 
as those who voted for primary opposition 
parties nor as positive about the economy as 
those who voted for the incumbent. 
Economic perceptions were simply not a 
factor for these voters. Further, economic 
perceptions did not impact the manner in 
which all voters evaluated third parties and 
third party leaders. It appears that third 
parties and their leaders are evaluated 
according to different criteria compared to 
the two main combatants in a provincial 
election campaign.  
The foregoing analysis opens some 
interesting possibilities for future research.  
The economy appeared to be a major issue 
in most of the recent provincial elections 
covered by the CPEP data. For the most part, 
federal economic voting literature examines 
the direct impact of economic perceptions 
on vote choice. However, less attention has 
been paid to the influence of economic 
perceptions on other aspects of 
electioneering such as evaluations of parties, 
leaders, issues positions, issue saliency, 
partisanship, and satisfaction with the 
performance of the provincial government. 
Further, economic perceptions seem to 
affect third parties differently than 
incumbent parties or primary opposition 
parties and more research could be done to 
understand this phenomenon.  Finally, more 
research could be done on how objective 
measures of strength of provincial 
economies, such as unemployment rate or 
GDP growth, could influence the evaluations 
of different types of party leaders and 
different types of political parties.   
Certain analysts have advanced the 
notion that the economy has become the 
defining issue of our times. John Ibbitson 
(2013) recently argued that the 2008 
financial crisis “still haunts us” and that “the 
economy matters above all” in Canadian 
politics. He quotes Nik Nanos, head of the 
polling firm Nanos Research, who calls the 
economy “an open wound” that dominates 
all other political issues in Canada. If this is 
the case, political scientists should be 
playing close attention to not just how 
economic perceptions affect vote choice but 
also how economic perceptions affect other 
aspects of Canadian electioneering. The 
CPEP data provide a valuable resource with 
which to understand how these economic 
perceptions shapes Canadians’ political 
views. 
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Endnotes 
 
1  We were more interested in ‘strong third 
parties’ as opposed to ‘fringe’ parties. Due its 
fringe nature, there were no CPEP questions 
about the third place Prince Edward Island NDP 
or its leader. Similarly, there were no questions 
about the third place Saskatchewan Green Party 
or its leader. Indeed, the PEI NDP received 3.2% 
of the popular vote and the Saskatchewan Green 
Party 2.9% of the vote. 
